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Eleanor M. Fox*
Platforms, Power, and the Antitrust
Challenge: A Modest Proposal to
Narrow the U.S.–Europe Divide
ABSTRACT
Big platforms dominate the new economy landscape. Colloquially
known as GAFA1 or FAANG,2 the high tech big data companies are
charged with using the power of their platforms to squelch start-ups,
appropriate rivals’ ideas, and take and commercialize the personal
data of their users.
Are the platforms violating the antitrust laws? Should they be bro-
ken up? Or are they the agents of progress in the new economy?
On these points, the United States antitrust law and the European
Union competition law may diverge. The Competition Directorate-Gen-
eral of the European Commission has brought proceedings against or
is investigating Google, Amazon, Apple, and Facebook. Germany,
under its own competition law, has condemned Facebook’s conduct.
Meanwhile, in the United States, authorities are skeptical, but they
have commenced investigations.
This Article is a comparative analysis of U.S. and EU law regard-
ing monopolization/abuse of dominance as background to understand-
ing why EU law is aggressive and U.S. law may be meek in the
treatment of the big tech platforms. First, it examines the factors that
underlie the two perspectives. Second, it considers three cases or
problems—Google/Comparative Shopping (EU), Facebook-Personal
Data (Germany), and dominant platforms’ acquisitions of start-ups
that are inchoate competitive threats, such as Facebook’s acquisitions
of WhatsApp and Instagram. The Article considers what lessons the
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW. If you would like to submit a re-
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1. Google, Amazon, Facebook, and Apple.
2. Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Netflix, and Google.
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latest Supreme Court antitrust decision, Ohio v. American Express
(AmEx),3 holds for the analysis of the big data antitrust issues. Third,
it asks what U.S. antitrust law and enforcement should do. It con-
cludes that U.S. antitrust law should reclaim its role as watchdog to
stop abuses of economic power, and makes suggestions for U.S. anti-
trust law to meet the big-platform challenge in a modest but meaning-
ful and practicable way.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The high tech/big data platforms have been labeled as BAADD—
“big, anti-competitive, addictive and destructive to democracy.”4 They
dominate our lives, “steal” and sell our data, manipulate our minds,
and use the power of their platforms to destroy or demote their rivals.
The platforms tell a different story: they are creators of new systems
that people want; they provide their popular services often at no
charge; their popularity is the fruit of invention and the hallmark of
success; any antitrust challenges will chill innovation. Moreover, the
problems that exist are in the realms of data protection or consumer
protection. The problems are boot-strapped into antitrust only by hip-
3. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). The case is highlighted because
it is a focus of this symposium issue.
4. How to Tame the Tech Titans: The Dominance of Google, Facebook and Amazon Is
Bad for Consumers and Competition, ECONOMIST (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www
.economist.com/leaders/2018/01/18/how-to-tame-the-tech-titans [https://perma
.unl.edu/S3D6-696E].
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ster populists who are anti-capitalist and would destroy the free mar-
ket system by handicapping creativity.5
This tug-of-war of the extremes distracts from the middle. There is
a large middle space for antitrust law—control over uses of economic
power to suppress competition and undermine the workings of the
market. To understand the claims of anticompetitive conduct, it is in-
structive to examine the antitrust treatment of big tech platforms by
the European Union and by Germany, for these jurisdictions have
been in the forefront in studying the issues and considering their anti-
trust dimensions. To understand the comparative reticence in the
United States (although this may be changing), it is useful to consider
the state of U.S. antitrust law. Since EU law and U.S. law are the
dominant antitrust models in the world, a focus on them is fitting.
This Article begins with a lay-of-the-land description of how the
EU law on abuse of dominance differs from the U.S. law of monopoli-
zation. It examines three matters in which Europe has acted or has
signaled its concerns with big tech. It considers the probable U.S.
treatment of the same problems, including implications of the latest
Supreme Court antitrust decision, Ohio v. American Express (AmEx).6
In AmEx, the Supreme Court reinforces U.S. conservatism—even
while public rhetoric demands greater antitrust activism especially
with a view to taming big tech.7
5. Hipster antitrust was coined as a derogatory term by antitrust experts who argue
that antitrust illegality should be reserved for conduct that harms consumer
welfare.
6. AmEx, 138 S. Ct. 2274.
7. See Chris Hughes, It’s Time to Break Up Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/09/opinion/sunday/chris-hughes-facebook-zuck
erberg.html [https://perma.unl.edu/5UVF-XQRE]; Greg Ip, Beware the Big Tech
Backlash: Overreaction to Content, Privacy Abuses Overlooks Real Problems: Lack
of Competition, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 19, 2018, 10:58 AM), https://www.wsj.com/arti
cles/beware-the-big-tech-backlash-11545227197 [https://perma.unl.edu/WM2A-
CA5W]. Senator Elizabeth Warren has proposed legislation to roll back acquisi-
tions by the big tech firms, including Facebook’s WhatsApp and Instagram, Ama-
zon’s Whole Foods, and Google’s Waze. She would require the dominant
platforms such as Google to structurally separate their platform business from
the products offered on it. Smaller platforms would be subject to duties of fair
dealing. See Asted W. Herndon, Elizabeth Warren Proposes Breaking Up Tech
Giants Like Amazon and Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.ny
times.com/2019/03/08/us/politics/elizabeth-warren-amazon.html [https://perma
.unl.edu/Y4JF-5H9L]. Senator Amy Klobuchar and others have introduced the
Consolidation Prevention and Competition Promotion Act of 2019, which would,
in the case of mega-mergers, shift the burden to the merging parties to prove that
the merger does not harm competition. S. 307, 116th Cong. (2019). Both U.S.
federal antitrust agencies, all but two states, and both branches of Congress are
investigating big tech. See Steve Lohr, Google Antitrust Investigation Outlined by
State Attorneys General, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/09/09/technology/google-antitrust-investigation.html [https://perma.unl
.edu/BVR8-ZRQ7].
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The Article concludes that the big tech markets are conducive to
behavior to suppress competition. This behavior is occurring. Yet its
harms are totally discounted by influential antitrust experts and pol-
icy makers who insist on a minimalist antitrust and maximal freedom
of even dominant firms. There are ways in which the U.S. antitrust
laws can protect the public from this suppression of competition de-
spite the constant narrowing of the law by the Supreme Court of the
United States.
II. A BRIEF COMPARISON OF U.S. AND EU LAW OF
MONPOLIZATION/ABUSE OF DOMINANCE
A. The United States
The U.S. Sherman Act was enacted in 1890, famously, to control
the power of the big trusts. Major legislation in 1914 and again in
1950 extended the reach of the law to control exclusionary practices
that had become rampant and to stem a rising tide of economic con-
centration that was thought to threaten democracy.8 For most of a
century the U.S. antitrust law was akin to the economic democracy of
markets.9 But beginning in the third quarter of the twentieth century,
the Supreme Court reversed course in the name of efficiency and free-
dom. Today U.S. monopoly law—Section 2 of the Sherman Act—has a
cabined scope. To run afoul of the law, a firm must not only misuse
monopoly power; it must create more power. Moreover, the courts ap-
ply a default presumption that conduct of even a monopoly firm is effi-
cient and good for consumers; thus, that it does not increase power.10
But the U.S. antitrust laws have one more weapon to combat uni-
lateral (non-conspiratorial) use of economic power: Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act. Section 5 prohibits “unfair methods of
competition.” “Unfair” is construed to mean “anticompetitive.” Given
the statutory language of “unfair methods,” the meaning of “anticom-
petitive” attributed to Section 5 can appropriately be more elastic than
the meaning of “anticompetitive” attributed to the Sherman Act. It
should be more elastic, for the Federal Trade Commission Act was
adopted as “a way to stop incipient Sherman Act violations, or, more
8. See 95 Cong. Rec. 11486 (1949) (statement of Rep. Emmanuel Celler on the Cel-
ler-Kefauver Amendment to Section 7 of the Clayton Act); Eleanor Fox, The Mod-
ernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140 (1981)
[hereinafter Fox, Modernization].
9. See Fox, Modernization, supra note 8.
10. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398
(2004); Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009); Eleanor
Fox, The Efficiency Paradox, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK:
THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 77 (R.
Pitofsky ed., 2008).
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broadly, undeserved growth.”11 Typically, however, the FTC hesitates
to stray from the narrow path of the Sherman Act.
B. Europe
Meanwhile in Europe, at the end of World War II, a core of Euro-
pean nations resolved to create a new structure of governance so as
never to have a war again. Six nations, led by Germany, France, and
Italy, formed the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951–1952
and then the European Economic Community in 1957–1958. This vi-
sionary project depended upon the realization of community—a single
European market. As Montesquieu said, “people who trade together
tend not to fight.”12 They come to respect one another, and hatreds
dissolve. Free trade and free movement in the internal market was at
the heart of the European conception. That meant nations’ border-bar-
riers had to fall. As the founders presciently anticipated, once tariffs
and quotas were abolished, private firms would re-erect them. Moreo-
ver, the member nations had nurtured their own national champions,
typically state-owned enterprises, entrenching nationalistic barriers.
Thus, it was necessary to embed antitrust in the Treaty13 itself, to
prevent private power and privileged enterprises from defeating the
project for economic community. As a result, the Treaty (now, the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) contains Article
101, which prohibits anticompetitive agreements, and Article 102,
which prohibits abuses of a dominant position,14 as well as other inte-
gral provisions to control public and private economic power.
Like the U.S., the EU went through two important phases with
regard to the question: When is single-firm conduct anticompetitive?
11. See Marc Winerman, The Origin of the FTC: Concentration, Cooperation, Control,
and Competition, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 88 (2003) (quoting proponents of the Act).
It was meant to be administrative and guiding, not penal. Two members of the
current Federal Trade Commission, Commissioners Rohit Chopra and Rebecca
Kelly Slaughter, dissenting from a report demurring on excessive pharmaceutical
prices, explain how the FTC’s unfair-methods-of-competition jurisdiction was in-
tended to reach beyond the antitrust laws to “policies that those laws were in-
tended to promote.” Statement of Commissioners Rohit Chopra and Rebecca
Kelly Slaughter, Federal Trade Commission Report on the Use of Section 5 to
Address Off-Patent Pharmaceutical Price Spikes, June 24, 2019, at 2, https://
www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1531606/p180101_section
_5_report_dissenting_statement_by_chopra_and_slaughter_6-27-19.pdf [https://
perma.unl.edu/S2MX-YAP7]. Use of the Federal Trade Commission Act is partic-
ularly appropriate in cutting-edge cases because there is no punitive consequence
of a declaration and order that conduct violates the law. No follow-on private
actions are authorized.
12. See BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, Book XX (1951).
13. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 25 March 1957.
14. See Alan Ryan, Antitrust Laws and Unilateral Conduct–Transatlantic Diver-
gences and How to Manage Them, New Frontiers of Antitrust Conference, CON-
CURRENCES COMPETITION L. REV. 3 (2018).
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In the first stage, EU law was formalistic. The law was aggressive
against dominant-firm conduct that excluded rival firms. It contained
a broad presumption against exclusive contracts by dominant firms.
The second phase came in the 1990s, and, even more dramatically, in
the first decade of the new millennium. This was epitomized by the
European Commission’s 2009 guidance paper on dominant firm con-
duct.15 In this second phase and in the guidance paper, the European
Commission adopted, and the courts followed, a more economic ap-
proach.16 While incorporating economic analysis into the law, Europe
retained certain guiding principles and approaches reflecting the
place of antitrust in the Treaty. These approaches include that EU law
is about community and integration. EU competition law is sympa-
thetic with EU internal market free-movement law, which stresses
the importance of free movement of goods, services and people across
Member State lines. Likewise, EU law is antagonistic to Member
State restraints and the privileges states grant to favored firms. Such
restraints and privileges are distortions of competition. Both as-
pects—respect for free movement and antagonism to state re-
straints—are imported into EU competition law and specifically into
abuse of dominance law. EU competition law stresses market access
and the right of firms to contest markets on the merits. It is sympa-
thetic to firms’ access to networks.17 It is hostile to dominant firms’
use of leverage to take advantages for themselves at the expense of
competitors, thereby unleveling the playing field. EU competition law
does not aim to protect inefficient competitors, but rather its prece-
dents forge a clearer path for firms to access markets on their merits,
free from obstructions by dominant firms. Still, detractors (including
many in the U.S. antitrust community) contend that the EU exces-
sively enforces its antitrust law against dominant firms (often Ameri-
can ones), and insist that the EU approach does protect competitors at
the expense of consumers.
15. Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of
the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings,
2009 O.J. (C 45/7).
16. See Nils Wahl, Recent Trends at the Court of Justice of the European Union, CON-
CURRENCES COMPETITION L. REV. 4 (2018).
17. Then-President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, listed a
“Digital single market” second among his ten Commission priorities for
2014–2019. EUROPEAN COMMISSION: 10 COMISSION PRIORITIES FOR 2014–2019,
https://ec.europa.eu/comission/priorities_en [https://perma.unl.edu/YM9P-RW
NY]. He said: “A Digital Single Market (DSM) is one in which the free movement
of persons, services and capital is ensured and where the individuals and busi-
nesses can seamlessly access and engage in online activities under conditions of
fair competition, and a high level of consumer and personal data protection, irre-
spective of their nationality or place of residence.” EUROPEAN COMMISSION: SHAP-
ING THE DIGITAL SINGLE MARKET, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/
policies/shaping-digital-single-market [https://perma.unl.edu/8YVR-7425].
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C. Presumptions and Divergences
EU competition law adopted its more economic approach nearly
two decades ago. However, it never adopted the “Chicago School”
premises. It does not assume markets work well. It does not admonish
us to trust the market—especially not when the market is concen-
trated and dominated by a single firm. It does not presume that anti-
trust intervention is likely to mess up the market and chill
competition and innovation. Its teaching implies a belief that lowering
barriers to entry and keeping a clear path for challengers is likely to
make the market more dynamic and thus serve consumers better.
When dealing with innovation incentives, U.S. cases are likely to as-
sume that antitrust action against a dominant firm will chill the
firm’s incentives to invent,18 while EU law is more likely to find that
the dominant firm’s challenged conduct will chill the outsiders’ incen-
tives to invent. EU cases have documented this lost innovation.19 U.S.
competition law abhors duties of dominant firms to deal with competi-
tors, calling such duties “forced sharing” and undermining incentives
to invent.20 EU law applies a contrary principle: dominant firms, espe-
cially firms with power in one market that compete in an adjacent
market, have a special responsibility not to impair rivals’ competition
on the merits.21
Both jurisdictions aim to preserve and facilitate sustainable low
pricing even if it displaces firms that cannot keep up with the competi-
tion. U.S. law, however, makes it harder than EU law to successfully
challenge below-cost pricing. U.S. law requires the plaintiff to prove a
probable recoupment scenario—that is, after the predatory siege, de-
fendant must be likely to recover its losses by charging monopoly
18. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398
(2004); Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009); Novell,
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064 (10th Cir. 2013). But see United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc).
19. See Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601 654 (ex-
amples of products by Sun and Novell that were stymied); European Commission
Press Release, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google C= 4.34 Billion For Illegal
Practices Regarding Android Mobile Devices to Strengthen Dominance of
Google’s Search Engine (July 18, 2018), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
18-4581_en.htm [https://perma.unl.edu/4XA6-52U5] (discussing the Android
forks example).
20. See Trinko, 540 U.S. 398.
21. See Eleanor Fox, Monopolization and Abuse of Dominance: Why Europe is Differ-
ent, 59 ANTITRUST BULL. 129 (2014); James Keyte, Why the Atlantic Divide on
Monopoly/Dominance Law and Enforcement Is So Difficult to Bridge, 33 ANTI-
TRUST 113 (Fall 2018); Francisco Marcos, The Prohibition of Single-Firm Market
Abuses: US Monopolization Versus EU Abuse of Dominance, INT’L CO. & COMM. L.
REV. 9 (2017).
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prices high enough and long enough.22 EU law does not require proof
of probable recoupment.23 It is enough that the predator thought the
scheme was worth it. Because of the strict U.S. requirements, preda-
tory pricing violations are virtually never proved under U.S. law.
Apart from these different presumptions and principles, much of
the law governing unilateral conduct is very similar on both sides of
the ocean. But the different presumptions and principles have re-
sulted in diametrically different results on nearly identical facts in
key cases, especially when the conduct challenged is a refusal to deal
with competitors or customers.24 The differences reveal themselves in
assessing the conduct of the big data platforms, as the Article shows
below.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR HIGH TECH, BIG DATA
A handful of high tech giants dominate markets. The firms were
started from scratch by entrepreneurs with great ideas, and they at-
tract millions of users every day. They are networks and platforms,
have economies of scale, and feature network effects and winner-take-
all markets. On the one hand, the network effects please users (who
get more “friends” or suppliers or buyers), but on the other hand, they
create uncommonly high barriers to entry and reinforce their market
power. The firms offer their products “free” on one side of the market
(but users give up their data); on the other side, they make huge reve-
nues from advertising, including by selling the data of their users. The
high tech firms operate with low-price models, not the high prices that
traditionally attract antitrust attention. Some have been exposed for
serious misuses or lax protection of data as well as for acquiring per-
sonal data from third party sources without permission. Some have
waged media campaigns of false information against critics. They offer
services in competition with the firms they host on their platforms,
and they prefer their own products and demote their rivals, under-
mine creative start-ups by appropriating their ideas, mine the data of
the firms they host to preempt the next big thing, snap up the start-
ups that are potential competitive threats, and breach privacy rights
of the platform’s users. Much of this conduct may violate consumer
protection and privacy protection laws. A question is whether the
22. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222,
224 (1993).
23. See Case C-62/86, Akzo Chemie v. Commission, ECLI: EU:C:1991:286. This case
was published in 1991 European Court Reports I-03359.
24. Fox, supra note 21, at 136–39; The Polish Telecom case has since been affirmed
by the General Court. Case T-486/11, Orange Polska S.A., formerly
Telekomunikacja Polska S.A. v. European Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2015:1002.
Moreover, the EU Court of Justice decided Intel, which leans more than previ-
ously towards an economic approach. C-413/14 P, Intel v. Commission,
ECLI:EU:C:2017:632.
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firms are also violating the competition laws. Does the answer depend
on whether the laws are those of the U.S. or those of the EU (and the
many jurisdictions that follow EU law)? It might.
The conduct we shall examine poses challenging questions under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits monopolization. The
first step of analysis is defining the market, and the exercise of market
definition is difficult.25 The second step is proof of monopoly power.
Monopoly power is traditionally defined as the power to raise price
above a competitive price and reduce output for a significant time.26
In platform markets, this proof may not be possible. The third step is
proof of conduct that is anticompetitive. The court may require the
plaintiff to establish that the conduct lowers output and raises
prices27 by anticompetitive means. This may not be possible. The plat-
forms are accumulating and using new forms of power. The big tech
abuses do not fit neatly into the “Chicago School” requirements.
Under EU competition law, the case for abuse of dominance is eas-
ier to make. EU law is less demanding of proof of definition of the
market. Moreover, a firm might hold a dominant position even when it
does not have monopoly power under the neoclassical economists’ defi-
nition. Status as a “gatekeeper” (power over a dominant platform)
might suffice.28 A firm might abuse its dominance when it uses its
power in one market to get significant competitive advantages in an
adjacent market and does so by conduct that blocks rivals’ access and
has no competitive merit,29 even if it does not get market power in the
second market.
These qualities of EU law make it a more flexible tool than the
Sherman Act to deal with the new problems posed by high tech/big
25. See Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., Keynote Address
at the University of Colorado Law School Silicon Flatirons Annual Technology
Policy Conference: “I’m Free”: Platforms and Antitrust Enforcement in the Zero-
Price Economy (Feb. 11, 2019); JACQUES CRE´MER, YVES-ALEXANDRE DE MONTJOYE,
& HEIKE SCHWEITZER, COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE DIGITAL ERA, REPORT TO THE
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Apr. 5, 2019), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publica
tions/reports/kd0419345enn.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/Y5AE-E34U] (drawing di-
ametrically opposite inferences on whether to overcome the difficulties with a
view towards possible enforcement or as a reason to retreat).
26. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
27. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2288 (2018) (“There is no such
evidence [‘that output was restricted or prices were above a competitive level’] in
this case.” (quoting Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509
U.S. 209, 237)); Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999). But see United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc).
28. See CRE´MER ET AL., supra note 25. If a platform is a gatekeeper or unavoidable
trading partner, this may imply sufficient market power to warrant examination
and possible proscription of conduct that suppresses competition.
29. See, e.g., Case C-549/10P, Tomra Systems ASA v. European Commission,
ECLI:EU:C:2012:221 (possibly qualified by C-413/14 P, Intel v. Commission,
ECLI:EU:C:2017:632).
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data. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits
unfair methods of competition, also has this flexibility, at least in
theory.30
IV. THREE EXAMPLES OF ALLEGED PLATFORM ABUSE
A. Google/Comparative Shopping
1. EU Law
In the Google/Comparative Shopping case, the European Commis-
sion condemned Google, as the dominant search engine, for demoting
its rivals and preferring itself on its platform. Here are the salient
facts it found:
Google held more than 90% of the general search market in Eu-
rope. It launched comparison shopping services. Google was not the
first to offer comparative shopping services on its platform; others pre-
ceded it. Google entered this market in 2004 with a product called
Froogle. But Froogle was not a good product. When Google Search
treated Froogle neutrally with its rivals, Froogle performed poorly.
This means, under neutral treatment, Froogle did not rank high on
the responses to consumer search queries; it was relegated to back
pages where it did not get many clicks—and clicks are the way prod-
ucts generate revenues through advertising. In 2008, Google changed
its strategy fundamentally to automatically give a prominent place to
Google’s product (which was renamed and revamped as Google Shop-
ping). Thereafter, Google Shopping appeared at or near the top of
search results for comparative shopping services, and it began to ap-
pear with rich graphical features. Google Search demoted rivals’ ser-
vices. Even the services of rivals that were most highly ranked by the
original neutral algorithm began to appear on average only on page 4.
Users seldom access, much less click on, links on page 4. (The top
search result on the computer page receives about 35% of the clicks;
page 1 results receive about 95%; the first result on page 2 receives
about 1%.) As a result of Google Search’s software program change,
traffic on Google Shopping increased substantially and traffic on the
rivals, in spite of their merit, decreased substantially. While the Com-
mission did not question Google’s choice to display rich graphic fea-
tures for the Google service at the top of the page of search results, the
30. The Federal Trade Commission Act provides an especially good basis on which to
formulate a new rule or standard to deal with new economic problems because
the consequence would simply be an injunction rather than high fines and treble
damage consequences. In fact, the imposition of high fines on a firm for conduct
that could not be known to be illegal feeds the claim of illegitimate application of
the law. This is especially so when the target of the enforcement is a foreign firm.
A vehicle that nurtures the development of legal principles in a context not bur-
dened with punishment is more likely to give rise to better law.
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Commission did question the fact that rivals could not get the same
advantage. As a result of its strategy, Google Shopping increased its
share in all thirteen markets in the European Economic Area, in
many by a large amount.
Summarizing the changes caused by the demotions, the Commis-
sion said:
• “Since the beginning of each abuse, Google’s comparison shop-
ping service has increased its traffic 45-fold in the United King-
dom, 35-fold in Germany, 19-fold in France, 29-fold in the
Netherlands, 17-fold in Spain and 14-fold in Italy.”
• “Following the demotions applied by Google, traffic to rival
comparison shopping services on the other hand dropped signif-
icantly. For example, the Commission found specific evidence of
sudden drops of traffic to certain rival websites of 85% in the
United Kingdom, up to 92% in Germany and 80% in France.
These sudden drops could also not be explained by other fac-
tors. Some competitors have adapted and managed to recover
some traffic but never in full.”31
The Commission concluded that Google abused its dominance by
using its leverage in search to give its own comparative shopping ser-
vice a significant advantage. The Commission found that Google had
no objective justification for this conduct. It found that Google’s
change to prefer its own comparative shopping service was not a prod-
uct improvement. Google had claimed as an improvement its addition
of rich format on top of the results presented for the Google Shopping
entry, but the Commission concluded that this addition could not be
counted as an improvement because Google gave the embellishment to
its product alone.
The Commission required Google to treat its own service equally
with rivals’ services. As usual, it required the undertaking to submit a
plan to achieve compliance with the decision. As well, the Commission
fined Google 2.42 million euros.
The case is on appeal to the European General Court. It will be
judged in view of the Court of Justice’s case law including the recent
Intel judgment,32 which emphasizes competitive effects. Whether a
dominant firm’s use of leverage to shift significant market share to
itself, seriously narrowing market opportunities for competitors, vio-
lates EU competition norms will be decided on appeal.33
31. See European Commission Press Release, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google
C= 2.42 Billion For Abusing Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal Advan-
tage to Own Comparison Shopping Service (June 27, 2017) (quoting Commission
Decision Case AT.39740, Google/Comparative Shopping (27 June 2017)).
32. Case C-413/14P, Intel v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2017:632.
33. The Commission has an advantage; the court is obliged to give significant defer-
ence to Commission decisions, especially regarding complex factual and economic
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2. U.S. Law
How would the Google/Comparative Shopping facts be analyzed
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act? The jurisprudence suggests sev-
eral good arguments for Google. First, market definition and market
power would be contested matters. Google asserts that vertical
searches are good alternatives to general search, enlarging the market
so as to minimize Google’s monopoly share of general search. Enlarg-
ing the market to include advertising (the paid side of the market)
would likewise expand proof problems, even though Google has been
labeled as dominant in online advertising with a 37% share. Second,
whatever the market, Google’s market power will be seriously con-
tested, with Google insisting that it cannot and does not raise prices,
reduce output, or lower quality. Third, in a similar comparative shop-
ping case, it would be difficult for a U.S. court to find an anticompeti-
tive abuse under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Google is not an
essential facility under U.S. law. It has no antitrust duty to deal
fairly, let alone to deal at all, with firms that want to use its platform,
except in rare circumstances.34 Moreover, it may be unlikely that, by
reason of its demoting strategy, it acquired market power in the adja-
cent market (comparative shopping web services). It may be doubtful
that it has power to limit output either in general search or in compar-
ative shopping web services. As a result of the conduct, consumers/
users are not confronted with a price rise, even though they do suffer a
non-quantifiable loss by being given second-best information in an-
swer to their queries, loss of the benefits of the improved performance
that stronger head-on competition could bring, and loss of access to
innovative products squeezed out by the demotions. (Whether the im-
pugned conduct elevates prices charged to advertisers remains to be
explored.)35 The losses, including chilling incentives of the demoted
rivals, is speculative and, even if true, Google would urge that the an-
titrust enforcement itself chills Google’s incentives to deliver innova-
tive products. U.S. law is sympathetic to the assumption that it
does.36
The facts of Google/Comparative Shopping find parallels across
the GAFA platforms. The abuse problem is probably not one of output
limitation. The problem is the distortion of the market so that the firm
findings. See Jose´ Luı´s da Cruz Vilac¸a, The Intensity of Judicial Review in Com-
plex Economic Matters—Recent Competition Law Judgments of the Court of Jus-
tice of the EU, 6 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 2, 173–88 (2018).
34. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398
(2004); Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft, 731 F.3d 1064 (10th Cir. 2013).
35. See Delrahim, supra note 25.
36. The Federal Trade Commission investigated Google for search bias in 2012–2013
but chose not to bring proceedings. See In the Matter of Google Inc., Statement of
FTC Regarding Google’s Search Practices, FTC File No. 111-0163 (2013) (closing
the investigation).
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with power, leverage and a conflict of interests succeeds for reasons
other than its merits, and the meritorious competition of rivals is
suppressed.
What might the AmEx case add to the analysis? AmEx could open
the door to full two-sided-market analysis, minimizing the market
power and the antitrust harm.37 AmEx makes it hard to infer market
power from exclusionary effects. AmEx puts a set of incumbent-prefer-
ring arguments into the mouth of Google.38
We suggest below that the Federal Trade Commission, enforcing
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (which prohibits un-
fair methods of competition), could overcome the above obstacles more
easily than could a court under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
B. Facebook–Abuse of Data
1. German Law
On February 7, 2019, the German Federal Cartel Office (FCO) held
that Facebook has violated the German abuse of dominance law by
gathering personal data from sources beyond Facebook (e.g., every
time the user clicks on “like”) without the users’ knowledge or permis-
sion, and using the data to compile a unique database on each user,
enabling Facebook to offer advertisers distinctly targeted advertising
and thus to enhance its revenues. The FCO characterized the violation
as an exploitative one—Facebook exploited users, rather than ex-
cluded rivals. The appellate court, however, has suspended the FCO’s
order pending appeal, after expressing doubts about the legal basis for
the decision.39 The following are some of the findings and analysis, as
summarized by the FCO.40
37. Lower courts might limit AmEx—as the case itself suggests—to situations in
which there is a simultaneous transaction on both sides of the market. But the
logic of the case (majority opinion) may go further.
38. For example, AmEx provides encouragement for the following arguments: Google
must continually invest in its platform services. Its zero-price user model re-
quires consideration of all avenues for recovering costs, including the need for
more clicks on the Google offerings to recover costs through the advertising side
of the market. Moreover, Google cannot degrade service and give less than opti-
mal search returns to its users because, once users discover a misfit between
their request and the search engine return, the users will merely click to a com-
petitor. Further, the court cannot infer competitive injury to anyone because
there is no “evidence that tends to prove that output was restricted or prices were
above a competitive level.” Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2288 (2018);
see supra note 27.
39. Higher Regional Court, Dusseldorf (Aug. 26, 2019).
40. Bundeskartellamt [Federal German Cartel Office], Bundeskartellamt prohibits
Facebook from combining user data from different sources: Background informa-
tion on the Bundeskartellamt’s Facebook proceeding (Feb. 7, 2019).
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Market, Market Power, and Dominance
Facebook is the largest social network in the world. It holds a dom-
inant position in the German market for social networks, having more
than a 90% market share. It has 2.3 billion active users worldwide,
with 1.5 billion using Facebook daily. Facebook users in Germany
number some 323 million monthly and 23 million daily. As to competi-
tion in Germany, Facebook faces only some small German providers,
and their suitability as an alternative social network is limited in view
of Facebook’s economies of scale and network effects.
The FCO expressly based the assessment of market power on more
than market share. It referenced recent amendments to the German
Competition Act to include as indicia of market power: “competitively
relevant data, economies of scale based on network effects, the beha-
viour of users who can use several different services or only one ser-
vice and the power of innovation-driven competitive pressure . . . .”41
Identity-based direct network effects were deemed an important fac-
tor in assessing Facebook’s market power. Also important were indi-
rect network effects stemming from advertiser-financed services: the
larger the user base, the more audience for ads and the more profits to
advertisers. Economies of scale that produce cost-savings “provide
Facebook with a far greater scope for strategic decisions than its com-
petitors have.”42 Facebook invoked multi-homing as a countervailing
force, but the FCO found the contention not established. Moreover, the
FCO found: “Facebook has superior access to competition-relevant
data, in particular the personal data of its users. As social networks
are data-driven products, access to such data is an essential factor for
competition in the market.”43 Lack of access to data “can be an addi-
tional barrier to market entry.”44
The Harm to Competition
The FCO found that Facebook imposes exploitative business
terms. “The damage for the users lies in loss of control: They are no
longer able to control how their personal data are used. They cannot
perceive which data from which sources are combined for which pur-
poses . . . .”45 Facebook “violates the constitutionally protected right to
informational self-determination.”46 Further competitive harm is
caused to advertising customers, who are faced with a dominant sup-
plier of advertising space in social networks.
41. Id. at 4.
42. Id. at 5.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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In finding an exploitative abuse, the FCO drew on contract princi-
ples and data protection principles, importing their values into anti-
trust analysis. Reference to the General Data Protection Regulation,
the FCO said, helped to confirm Facebook’s lack of justification for ex-
ploiting users’ data. The FCO recognized Facebook’s legitimate inter-
ests in processing the data, but found that the legitimate interests did
not outweigh the harm to users’ interests.
Facebook’s Conduct Poses a Competition Problem
The FCO said that access to market data is essential to the market
position of social network companies. “Access to data, above all in the
case of online platforms and networks,”47 is specified as a relevant
factor for dominance by the German Competition Act. “Monitoring the
data processing activities of dominant companies is therefore an es-
sential task of a competition authority, which cannot be fulfilled by
data protection officers.”48
Remedy
The FCO imposed no fine. Its aim was to change behavior.
Facebook was required to submit a plan for compliance.
* * *
The German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy is
further studying digital platforms and abuse of market power to deter-
mine whether modernization of the law is necessary. An expert com-
mittee issued a report,49 and a follow-up committee is tasked to
suggest means to implement the initial report.
European Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager, while
studying the report, noted “the importance of monitoring data monop-
olies and internet gatekeepers that can choke off data access to ri-
vals.”50 Moreover, the Directorate-General for Competition
commissioned its own report.51 Meanwhile, a new Commission has
been constituted. Vestager has not only been reappointed the Compe-
tition Commissioner, she has been appointed Executive Vice President
for the EU’s digital policy.
47. Id. at 7.
48. Id.
49. Heike Schweitzer et al., Modernising the Law on Abuse of Market Power: Report
for the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, https://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3250742 [https://perma.unl.edu/H8LA-E29H]
(last visited June 29, 2019).
50. Aoife White & Lenka Ponikelska, Germany’s Facebook Order Will Be Studied by
EU, Vestager Says, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Feb. 8, 2019, 5:49 AM), https://www.bloom
berg.com/news/articles/2019-02-08/germany-s-facebook-order-will-be-studied-by-
eu-vestager-says [https://perma.unl.edu/HQ5V-VNEK].
51. CRE´MER ET AL., supra note 25.
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2. U.S. Law
Abuse in the collection and use of data, especially by the big data
companies, is a big concern in the world. The abuses and their reme-
dies are being studied in many jurisdictions in addition to Germany
and the EU, including Australia, Japan and the UK.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act offers no parallel application to the
German case. In the United States, a plaintiff would face difficulties
at the outset in defining the market and proving monopoly power. But
more basically, the claim of violation by abuse of data collecting, in-
cluding from third party sites, and collecting and using the data sur-
reptitiously and deceitfully, does not fit with the U.S. antitrust laws.
The Sherman Act imposes no special responsibility, not even on a mo-
nopoly firm, to have regard for rivals or users. The right to refuse to
deal (or to deal on chosen terms) is strong. Moreover, the German
Facebook violation is an exploitative violation, not an exclusionary
one, and Section 2 does not prohibit exploitative behavior (e.g., exces-
sive prices).52 The German Facebook proceeding did not include exclu-
sionary practices. Such practices, alleged elsewhere, include
Facebook’s cutting off user access to an improvement by Vine, a video-
creating and sharing platform, apparently because Facebook took the
Vine product to be a competitive threat to it.53
Might lessons from AmEx play a role in the analysis? Let us postu-
late that consumers, including business users, are harmed on one side
of the market. Their valuable data is coerced from them, aggregated
from third party sources, and monetized lucratively. The social net-
work charges zero (plus the data) to users and sells curated space to
advertisers, making possible the zero user-charge. AmEx and other
decisions would counsel to count positively Facebook’s efficiencies in
data use and improvement of its services though collection and use of
its data trove.
The FCO did consider the advertiser side of the market. It con-
cluded that Facebook exploited advertisers as well as users. It did
take note of efficiency benefits through increased accuracy of advertis-
ers in targeting likely buyers, and benefits of the network’s declining
marginal costs, but it counted those advantages as contributors to
Facebook’s power, not as contributors to the public’s or consumers’
welfare. The FCO determined that the users’ interests outweighed
Facebook’s interests. It so concluded not because, if monetized, the
52. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398
(2004). As for exclusionary, there have been complaints against Facebook (Vine),
but they are not part of the FCO case.
53. See Adi Robertson, Mark Zuckerberg Personally Approved Cutting off Vine’s
Friend-Finding Feature, THE VERGE (Dec. 5, 2018, 10:35 AM), https://www
.theverge.com/2018/12/5/18127202/mark-zuckerberg-facebook-vine-friends-api-
block-parliament-documents [https://perma.unl.edu/PST7-N23K].
2019] A MODEST PROPOSAL 313
Euro-amount of the gains to Facebook was less than the Euro-amount
of the losses to users, but on quasi-constitutional grounds: people have
a right to control their data and to know how it is going to be used; it
was wrong for a dominant firm to coerce users to give up their data
rights if they were to use Facebook’s service at all.
While Section 2 of the Sherman Act has strict limits, Section 5 of
the FTC Act is a more flexible vehicle. The FTC is not bound to ignore
a problem just because Facebook’s conduct may be exploitative rather
than exclusionary or just because it interfaces with data privacy.
Moreover, the FTC has consumer protection powers and Facebook’s
behavior raises serious consumer protection concerns. Indeed, the
FTC already has a file on Facebook and has just penalized Facebook
$5 billion for sharing with Cambridge Analytica, a political consultant
to then-candidate Trump, data of 87 million Facebook users, which it
used to compile voter profiles.54 If a data privacy problem is mixed
with a consumer protection problem and possibly an antitrust problem
(e.g., an abusive cut-off of access, or an anticompetitive acquisition),
the FTC is well placed to consider the abuses together for whatever
synergies may be mined. If vested with the multi-faceted matter, the
FTC could consider formulating some rules and controlling principles,
such as banning self-dealing and disallowing efficiency as a defense to
coercion and deception.
C. Start-Ups: Nipping Competition in the Bud
Major platforms such as Facebook, through their massive data
troves collected in part from the targets themselves, are well posi-
tioned to identify the promising start-ups that pose the greatest com-
petitive threats to the platform, and buy them up or stamp them out.
Because the start-ups typically lack significant revenues, the acquisi-
tion may be below the turnover thresholds required for premerger fil-
ing in some jurisdictions. Moreover, any single such acquisition may
just be ignored as too insignificant.
Competition authorities in several jurisdictions are considering the
need to be tougher on dominant platforms’ systematically buying their
most promising and threatening would-be rivals. Germany has re-
vised its merger control thresholds to add a value-of-the-transaction
test and to include debt as part of value, so that these rising-star
start-ups do not escape assessment.55 The most commonly cited exam-
54. See Press Release, FTC, FTC Imposes $5 Billion Penalty and Sweeping New Pri-
vacy Restrictions on Facebook (July 24, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/
press-releases/2019/07/ftc-imposes-5-billion-penalty-sweeping-new-privacy-re
strictions [https://perma.unl.edu/N4QK-949Z].
55. Ninth Amendment to the German Act Against Restraints of Competition, effec-
tive 9 June 2017. See Falk Shoening et al., Mind the Gap—New Size-Of-Transac-
tion Test in German Merger Control—New German Competition Law: Germany
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ples of allegedly anticompetitive “snap-ups” is Facebook’s acquisitions
of Instagram and of WhatsApp, both of which platforms provide im-
portant alternatives for social network users seeking a model friend-
lier to younger users.
The future of such start-ups may be highly speculative at the time
of acquisition. But what if, as it has been alleged, the dominant plat-
form either buys up or stamps out all potentially threatening start-
ups to preserve its dominance? The tale of Snapchat may be a caution-
ary one. Facebook pursued Snapchat. Snapchat said no. Then
Facebook appropriated Snapchat’s signature innovation: stories—a
photo and video post-platform. The story is told in Facebook is Killing
Snapchat with the Format It Created.56
The big data strategies are reminiscent of tales of the Standard Oil
Trust. By some reckoning the conduct may be called efficient. So was
Standard Oil’s conduct, as insisted by historian John S. McGee.57 But
the efficiencies of Standard Oil’s strategies did not prevent the giant
predatory trust from being Exhibit A to the very enactment of the
Sherman Act and did not dissuade the Supreme Court from breaking
it up.58
There are several big challenges to thwarting the so-called “killer
acquisitions.” One is to be able to identify the anticompetitive quali-
ties of the acquisition at the time of vetting. The second is this: sup-
pose the acquisitions are indeed harmful to competition today. It is
possible under existing U.S. antitrust law, although not common, to
obtain divestiture of assets whose acquisition turned out to be an-
ticompetitive. The challenge, however, is to prove both that the consol-
idation is on balance anticompetitive (in spite of efficiency aspects
such as better use of data), and that divestiture will noticeably pro-
duce competition and make consumers/users better off. Third, the pos-
sibility of sale to the dominant platform has been an incentive for
start-ups to start up in the first place. One would want to be able to
predict that the loss of this route to “success” would not cause more
harm than good.
Takes A Pioneering Role in Adapting Its Competition Law to The Digital Econ-
omy, HOGAN LOVELLS (June 21, 2017), https://www.hlregulation.com/2017/06/21/
mind-the-gap-new-size-of-transaction-test-in-german-merger-control/ [https://per
ma.unl.edu/RB5S-GEPB].
56. Bryan Clark, Facebook is Killing Snapchat with the Format It Created, THE NEXT
WEB (May 21, 2018), https://thenextweb.com/socialmedia/2018/05/21/facebook-is-
killing-snapchat-with-the-format-it-created/ [https://perma.unl.edu/YLE9-B359].
57. See John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L.
ECON. 137 (1958).
58. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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V. PROPOSALS
The “do nothing” and the “break them up” approaches are extreme
policy approaches that at the one end would leave real competition
problems unaddressed and at the other would apply blunt instru-
ments to cure huge state-of-the-world dilemmas that pose daunting
implementation problems and are sure to leave unfilled expectations
in their wake.
There are three reasons why the United States might wish to take
Europe’s big data initiatives more seriously. First, European competi-
tion law is the law in a substantial part of the world. If the U.S. wants
to be relevant in international transactions, it must appreciate Euro-
pean perspectives. Second, top down regulation is a possible substi-
tute for antitrust. If the antitrust agencies ignore abuses of economic
power that people care about, more intrusive regulation is likely to fill
the gap. European competition policy gives some insight into how an-
titrust, complemented with consumer protection and privacy protec-
tion, can be an alternative to more intrusive regulation.59 Third,
Europe may be right in some not insignificant ways.
We focus on the third point. Europe may be right. We address the
skeptics who insist that there is no competition problem and that, if
there is, it cannot be solved except by remedies that are worse than
the disease. Is there a competition problem? Let us return to the three
problems analyzed: (1) the Google/Comparative Shopping problem;
(2) the German Facebook problem; and (3) acquisitions by dominant
platforms of potentially threatening start-ups. Starting with the last,
it is now recognized that the acquisitions of nascant competitors might
be anticompetitive. If so, they are fair game for divestiture—if divesti-
ture will indeed produce the desired competition. Going forward, these
acquisitions should be vetted more seriously.
There is a philosophical divide between those who want to give
more breathing space to even dominant platforms to buy promising
start-ups whose futures are speculative, and those who are alarmed
that the platforms are snapping up all threatening startups and are
thereby insulating themselves from the competitive forces that could
make them accountable.60 These are the usual philosophical tugs and
play out with little fanfare (or get submerged) in the course of techno-
cratic merger review.
The middle category—the German Facebook case—is largely a
problem of deception, privacy invasion, and exploitation of people who
59. This is not to say that we do not need top-down regulation, as in privacy protec-
tion. The Federal Trade Commission supports a national privacy regulation law.
See Cecilia Kang, F.T.C. Commissioners Back Privacy Law to Regulate Tech Com-
panies, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/08/business/
ftc-hearing-facebook.html [https://perma.unl.edu/WV4X-NU3L].
60. For example, there could be real competition on privacy terms.
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provide their data. While the German FCO was able to blend the sev-
eral disciplines, the underlying problem treated in the German
Facebook case is not likely to be seen as an antitrust problem in the
United States.
We come, then, to category number 1: gatekeepers abuse the users
of their platforms who compete with them, systematically downgrad-
ing the rivals, sabotaging their inventions, and appropriating their
ideas to outcompete them. How to define the market, how to assess
market power, how to identify an abuse as anticompetitive, and how
to devise a remedy are all contested issues. In part, the divide is ideo-
logical. Do we stress that Google (for example) created its platform,
conclude that it should be able to use it as it likes, and assume that
legal duties will handicap invention? Or do we highlight Google’s con-
flict of interests and observe that downgrading often-better rivals is
inefficient as well as unfair? Do we emphasize that clogging the path
to market interferes with the competition process, chills the incentives
of the platform users, and defeats expectations of consumers, who ex-
pect best answers to their queries? In this late day of the political
economy debate, the divide will not be closed by evidence or econom-
ics. The popular sentiment, however, tends to coincide with the con-
cerns about power, its abuse, and the unaccountability of the
dominant platforms.61
Here are six suggestions for U.S. law, based on this author’s per-
ception that the big data antitrust abuses are real and pressing:
1. Recognize that the dominant big data platforms have economic
power sufficient to cause competitive harms. When conduct of
a dominant platform has demonstrable anticompetitive quali-
ties, we should simplify the proofs of power and effects and get
quickly to the question of procompetitive justifications.62 An-
ticompetitive qualities include clauses and conduct to frustrate
multi-homing, interoperability, and data portability. If the
platform engages in conduct to raise rivals’ costs, to make al-
ternatives infeasible, or to marginalize rivals, the burden
should shift; and if defendants offer no credible procompetitive
61. See supra note 7. Recent scholarly studies tend to support the concerns. See, e.g.,
JASON FURMAN, UNLOCKING DIGITAL COMPETITION, REPORT OF THE DIGITAL COM-
PETITION EXPERT PANEL (Mar. 13, 2019), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/785547/unlocking_digi
tal_competition_furman_review_web.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/FWY5-64WR]
(an independent report on the state of competition in digital markets, with pro-
posals to boost competition and innovation for the benefit of consumers and
businesses).
62. The FTC initiated such an approach in Matter of Massachusetts Bd. of Registra-
tion in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549 (1988), and a similar approach is suggested by
Justice Breyer in his dissenting opinions in AmEx and in Cal. Dental Ass’n v.
FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
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explanation or justification, the conduct should be prohibited.
The Federal Trade Commission is well situated to do this job.63
2. Much conduct is likely to require deeper study of pros and cons.
The FTC should examine the practices, listen to the justifica-
tions, and judge the conduct. It should not be required to prove
that the platform’s conduct will lessen output in the relevant
market as a condition precedent to finding an offense. Output
limitation is not the problem. To clarify the law, the FTC might
write rules under its rule-making authority.
3. In the case of a dominant platform that also hosts its own ser-
vices on the platform, the gatekeeper has a conflict of interest.
The FTC should seriously consider establishing a duty of domi-
nant platforms to treat all firms that are rivals on the platform
(including its own) neutrally. As a first step the FTC should
require the platform either to announce clearly regarding
search query returns: “You are advised that we give preference
to our own product”64 or to offer neutral, merit-based treat-
ment. This can be done immediately. Writers and implement-
ers of the algorithm should be rewarded on the basis of the
system’s performance, not on the basis of the platform’s own
products’ performance.
4. More research should address the efficiency and innovation
properties of a dominant platform’s duties of fair dealing.
Framed differently: Do we get more, and more dynamic, inno-
vation (1) in a world in which the dominant platform has no
antitrust duties to those who use its platform in competition
with it, or (2) in a world in which the platform has the duty of
neutral treatment?
5. Strategies of dominant firms to nip emerging competition in
the bud by preemptive strike acquisitions should be taken seri-
ously.65 Anticompetitive acquisitions of start-ups should be
63. AmEx cuts in the other direction. AmEx approves a restraint that gags
merchants from giving consumers truthful price information because if consum-
ers know their options they might switch. This is wrong.
64. A new EU regulation (not yet in effect) would require online platforms to be more
transparent with the businesses that deal on their platforms. It would require
the platforms, among other things, to reveal whether they give preference to their
own offerings, and how. See EU introduces transparency obligations for online
platforms, June 14, 2019, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releas
es/2019/06/14/eu-introduces-transparency-obligations-for-online-platforms/
[https://perma.unl.edu/RH7K-HTLC].
65. The Federal Trade Commission is in the process of investigating the antitrust
implications of Facebook’s scores of acquisitions. See Brent Kendall, John D. Mc-
Kinnon & Deepa Seetharaman, FTC Antitrust Probe of Facebook Scrutinizes Its
Acquisitions, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ftc-anti-
trust-probe-of-facebook-scrutinizes-its-acquisitions-11564683965 [https://perma
.unl.edu/Y49U-QKKT].
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prohibited under the merger laws. Strategies of dominant
firms to nip competitors in the bud should be prohibited as mo-
nopolistic conduct.
6. When the public cries: “Abuse by big data,” antitrust techno-
crats often respond: “Not my problem.” This is the wrong an-
swer. We need to break out of silo-thinking that reduces
antitrust to output-limiting conduct and assumes that single-
firm conduct is efficient.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the big data platforms do pose problems that are an-
titrust problems. There are antitrust means to call big data to account.
It is time for the United States to stop the big data antitrust abuses.
